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RECENT CASES
CORPORATION LAW-OFFICERS-PROFITs RESULTING FROM THE USE
OF INSIDE INFORMATION INURE TO THE CORPORATION ALTHOUGH NO HARM
To THE CORPORATION WAS ALLEGED
Management Assistance, Inc. (MAI), a New York corporation, purchases
used IBM machines and leases the equipment to other companies. MAI assumes
under its leases an obligation to maintain and service the equipment. In order
to meet this obligation, MAI enters into servicing agreements with the Inter-
national Business Machine Corporation (IBM). Sometime prior to August 1966
IBM Corp. notified MAI that an increase in service charges would become
effective on August 1. This increase had a severe effect on MAI's earnings-
the first month in which the increase went into effect MAI's earnings were off
400%.' The increase in IBM's service charge and its impact upon MAI's
August earnings was not made public until October 18, 1966 when it was printed
in the Wall Street Journal. However, before such publication it became apparent
to the defendants, solely by virtue of their position as MAI's directors, that
earnings would be sharply reduced.2 In September the defendants sold 56,500
shares of MAI common stock which was at that time trading at a high of $28.
After the public announcement of the decline in earnings the stock traded at a
low of $11 per share. Thus, by selling prior to the drop in price the defendants
realized profits of approximately $960,500. The plaintiff brought a stockholder's
derivative action3 asking defendants to account to MAI for the profits. Defen-
dants moved for dismissal on the ground that plaintiff's motion failed to state
a cause of action. The Supreme Court, New York County, in granting the
motion, held no cause of action was stated because the alleged "breach of duty
was not in relation to the conduct of the business of the corporation."'4 On
appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, one judge dissenting without opinion.
Held, the profits realized from the traded stock should inure to the corporation
since such profits resulted from the use of "inside information" which belonged
not to the defendants but to the corporate entity. Diamond v. Oreamund, 29
A.D.2d 285, 287 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1st Dep't 1968).
Under the common law of deceit, in an arm's length transaction where no
fiduciary relation exists, a person is liable only for misrepresentation of a ma-
terial fact.5 Mere nondisclosure does not constitute a breach of duty.6 In order to
1. MAI earned $66,233 in August, 1966 as compared with $262,263 in July, 1966.
(Wall Street Journal, Oct. 19, 1966, at 17, col. 4).
2. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 29 A.D.2d 285, 286, 287 N.Y.S.2d 300, 302 (1st Dep't 1968)
[hereinafter cited as instant case].
3. It should be noted that plaintiff was not the purchaser of the stock nor was it
alleged that the corporation purchased any stock.
4. Plaintiff-Appellant's brief R 10. Judge Gold's opinion was not reported.
5. A material fact, relative to a stock transaction, is defined as a fact which would, if
generally known, ultimately cause a significant change in market price. In addition, " ... the
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mitigate the harshness of this rule, the courts have developed a number of ex-
ceptions. If a person makes any disclosure, he has a duty to say enough so that
his words will not be misleading7 Also, there is a duty to disclose material facts
if a fiduciary relationship can be found. However, the majority of courts have
held that though an officer or director occupies a fiduciary relation to the
corporation they owe no fiduciary duty to an individual stockholder. The courts
adhering to this so-called "majority" rule8 reason that officers and directors are
not strict trustees since as officers and directors they do not take legal title to
the corporate property. They are considered fiduciaries (quasi-trustees) to the
corporation, however, because they are placed in a position of trust to manage
the corporation's business affairs.9 But the majority of courts hold there is no
logical reason to extend the directors' corporate fiduciary duty to the individual
stockholders.' 0 The "majority" rule would appear to be adopted from the law of
trusts. The law states that fiduciary duty only attaches when the trustee deals
with the corpus of his trust, corporate property and business opportunities. But
the officer or director is not dealing with the corpus of his trust when he sells
his own shares or purchases shares in the corporation." Moreover, the mere
relation of officer or director to stockholder is not sufficient to raise an implied
trust analogous to that of financial advisor and client. 12 Nor is a business rela-
tion between two parties itself sufficient to create a confidential relation between
the parties and thereby become a basis for imposing a constructive trust.' 3 The
mere fact of superior knowledge on the part of the director or officer is held not
to create a fiduciary duty14 since the shareholder is free to ask for a summary of
news must be capable of physical exploitation in the market by some individual before the
matter becomes public knowledge." H. Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market 55
(1966).
6. W. Prosser, Torts § 101 and cases cited therein. (3d ed. 1964).
7. Id. at n.28.
8. The "majority" rule has been adopted by twenty states. Cases are cited in Chenery
Corp. v. S.E.C., 128 F.2d 303, 307 (D.C. Cir. 1942), remanded on other grounds, 318 U.S. 80
(1943).
9. 3 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations § 838 and cases cited therein (1965 rev ed.).
10. This theory was stated as early as 1847 by the court in Smith v. Hurd, 53 Mass.
(12 Met.) 371, 384 (1847):
There is no legal privity, relation, or immediate connection, between holders of
shares... in their individual capacity, on the one side, and the directors . . . on
the other. The directors are not the . . . trustees of individual stockholders.
11. Chatz v. Midco Oil Corp., 152 F.2d 153, 155 (7th Cir. 1945); Adams v. Mid-West
Chevrolet Corp., 198 Okla. 461, 179 P.2d 147, 156 (1947).
12. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659, 660 (1933).
13. In Fisher v. Guaranty Trust Co., 259 App. Div. 176, 182 18 N.Y.S.2d 328, 334(2d Dep't 1940), aff'd per curiam, 285 N.Y. 679, 34 N.E.2d 379 (1941) the court stated that,
"No matter what the relationship is or may be termed, it has never been held that the
director is accountable for the proceeds of his purchase where the stockholder did not rely
on the director in making the sale." See 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 482 (2d ed 1962)
at p. 150.
14. The court in Goodwin v. Agassiz stated:
Fiduciary obligations of directors ought not to be made so onerous that men of
experience and ability will be deterred from accepting such office. Law in its sanc-
tions is not coextensive with morality. It cannot undertake to put all parties to
every contract on an equality as to knowledge, experience, skill and shrewdness. It
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facts on which the insider is basing his sale or purchase. In such a case, the law
of fraud requires a complete disclosure by the insider. A half truth under the
circumstances would be equivalent to misrepresentation. Thus, under the "ma-
jority" rule the individual shareholder deals at arm's length with the corporate
director and should not expect him to volunteer information regarding the future
value of the corporate stock.
The "special facts" doctrine, first enunciated in Strong v. Repide,15 repre-
sents an exception to the "majority" rule. The courts following the "special
facts" doctrine 16 impose a limited fiduciary duty on the director in stock trans-
actions with an individual shareholder. In situations where the director gains
special knowledge of circumstances which might affect the value of the stock,
17
a fiduciary relationship is created. The director in that instance has a legal
obligation to disclose any and all facts affecting the value of the stock. The third
rule imposing duties of disclosure on an officer or director has been labeled by
the courts as the "minority" rule.' 8 This rule carries the degree of the fiduciary
cannot undertake to relieve against hard bargains made between competent parties
without fraud. (Emphasis added.)
283 Mass. 358, 362-63, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (1933).
The court's statement seems quite surprising in view of the fact that one year later
§ 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act was passed by Congress. The congressional hearings
indicate that § 16 (b) was specifically designed to protect "outside" stockholders from
"insiders" with advance information. See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 236 n.8
(2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751, citing Hearings before Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1934); Rubin
and Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions Upon Unfair Use of Corporate Information by Insiders,
95 U. Pa. L. Rev. 468 (1947).
But see Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 725, 746 (1956).
15. 213 U.S. 419 (1909) (In Strong v. Repide a director had purchased 800 shares in
the company while he was negotiating a contract which would make the shares worth
approximately eight times their sale price. The Supreme Court held that, entirely apart
from the question of whether the defendant was bound to act like any other fiduciary, he
should "in consideration of all the existing circumstances . .. [have made full disclosure
of all) the facts before making the purchase.") Id. at 431.
16. New York has adopted the "special facts" rule. See, e.g., Lesnik v. Public Indus-
trials Corporation, 144 F.2d 968 (2d Cir., 1944).
17. In the instant case the knowledge of a decline in corporate earnings would be
clasified as "special facts," thereby making the defendant a fiduciary to the purchaser and
necessitating an affirmative disclosure of the plight of the corporation. The argument that
a person not already a stockholder in the corporation who buys from a director or officer
of the corporation is not owed a fiduciary obligation was answered by Judge Learned Hand:
When they [corporate officers) sold shares, it could indeed be argued that they were
not dealing with a beneficiary, but with one whom his purchase made a beneficiary.
That should not, however, have obscured the fact that the director or officer as-
sunted a fiduciary relation to the buyer by the very sale; for it would be a sorry
distinction to allow him to use the advantage of his position to induce the buyer
into the position of a beneficiary, although he was forbidden to do so, once the
buyer had become one.
Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (1951). (Emphasis added). See 3 Loss, Securities Regu-
lation 1455 (2d ed. 1961): "It is safe to assume that an outsider selling to a person who
is not already a stockholder has the same fiduciary obligation as an insider who buys
from a stockholder."
18. The leading cases cited as authority for the "minority" rule are Oliver v. Oliver,
118 Ga. 632, 45 S.E. 232 (1903) (the president of the company purchased shares at $110
failing to disclose an assured sale of the company plant which made the shares worth $185),
and Stewart v. Harris, 69 Kan. 498, 77 P. 277 (1904) (The defendant insider stated to the
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relationship between director and shareholder one step further in establishing a
fiduciary obligation. The director or officer cannot enter a stock transaction
without first fully disclosing any material fact he knows about the corporation's
activities. Under the "minority" rule the courts have held the officers and direc-
tors to be fiduciaries of each individual stockholder. 19 The courts adhering to
the "minority" rule reason that when officers or directors use corporate inside
information to trade in the stock of the corporation, they are using a corporate
asset which is the property of the corporation.20 Therefore, an officer or director
should not be permitted to use inside information for his personal profit. From
this basic premise, the court in Diamond held that the fiduciary duty of the
defendant directors2 ' bars their personal gain made by the advance use of
corporate inside information.2
Though prior to Diamond, New York courts had carved out an exception
to the "majority" rule by adopting the "special facts" doctrine the courts had
restricted payment of the insider's profits to the individual shareholder. 28 How-
ever, the question that arises, as in the principal case, is should the insider
account to the corporation? Basic trust law would put the rights of recovery in
the corporation the theory being that since the insider used a corporate asset,
corporate inside information, for his personal gain he thereby violated his
fiduciary duty to the corporation. Yet the courts have held otherwise. Directors
and officers may deal in the stock of their corporation since the corporate stock
is held to be personal property24 and is not within the scope of the director's
fiduciary duties to the corporation.25 This rule is based on the theory that a
corporation has no interest in its outstanding shares. The shares are not assets
of the corporation and are, therefore, not part of the corpus of the director's
trust. However, the courts have announced certain exceptions.
New York courts have found a sufficient cause of action in a stockholder's
derivative action when, as a result of the insider's stock transaction, there was: a
plaintiff that the firm was in bad condition and pointed out that a large amount of property
had been charged off when he knew the property had since become valuable).
19. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 263 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 885.
20. Ballantine, Corporations 213 (Rev. ed. 1946); Taylor v. Wright, 69 Cal. App. 2d
371, 381, 159 P.2d 980, 984-85 (1945).
21. The court stated, "The information Oreamuno and Gonzalez [defendants] acquired
pertained to, and they obtained it in the course of managing, the affairs of MAI, their
principal." Instant case at 286, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 302.
22. The lower court's decision, which dismissed plaintiff's allegations for failure to state
a cause of action, was reversed by the Appellate Division on the sole theory that the defen-
dants used a corporate asset for their personal gain. The court stated, "We need not in this
case concern ourselves with added elements. These fiduciaries . . . are being charged because
they converted into money to their own use something belonging not to them but to their
corporation-inside information." Id. at 288, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 303-304.
23. Lesnik v. Public Industrials Corporation, 144 F.2d 968 (2d Cir., 1944).
24. 11 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations § 5096 (1965 rev. ed.).
25. Kaufman v. Wolfson, 153 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Hauben v. Morris, 255
AD. 35, 5 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1st Dep't 1938), aff'd, 281 N.Y. 652, 22 N.E.2d 482.
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transfer of corporate control; 26 "looting" of the corporation;2 7 loss and waste
of corporate assets; 28 and diversion of a corporate opportunity.29 But the
common denominator in the above cases is an alleged harm to the corporation.
No court in New York has held directors accountable to their corporation for
profits made unless the corporation sustained some loss or harm by the director's
action. 0 Interestingly enough, in a Delaware case Brophy v. Cities Service Co.,3 1
the court was presented with a similar issue to that posed by Diamond. The
Brophy court specifically ruled that harm to the corporation need not be shown:
In equity, when the breach of a confidential relation by an employee
is relied on and an accounting for any resulting profits is sought, loss
to the corporation need not be charged in the complaint.3 2
The court concluded that since the defendant had used confidential information
belonging to the corporation the profits made in the stock transaction also
belonged to the corporation. The Brophy court's reasoning was obviously pre-
dicated on the same fiduciary principles which were held acceptable by the court
in Diamond.
New York common law does not impose upon directors a fiduciary duty
which precludes them from selling their stock in the corporation they represent.83
Accordingly the court in Diamond is careful to note:
These fiduciaries are not being charged because they sold stock,
or because transactions in securities might subvert their proper func-
tioning as executives of MAI or blemish its reputation.34
Rather, the court held the directors were being charged because they used a
corporate asset i.e. corporate inside information, for their personal gain. Further-
more, the fact that the directors' method of conversion, in realizing profits, was
26. See, e.g., Benson v. Braun, 286 A.D. 1098, 145 N.Y.S.2d 711 (2d Dep't 1955).
See generally, Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1956).
27. See, e.g., Leibert v. Clapp, 13 N.Y.2d 313, 196 N.E.2d 540 (1963).
28. See, e.g., Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
29. See, e.g., Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934).
30. See, Fontheim v. Walker, 282 App. Div. 373, 122 N.Y.S.2d 642 (1st Dep't 1953),
aff'd 306 N.Y. 923, 119 N.E.2d 605. But see Bailey v. Jacobs, 325 Pa. 187, 194, 189 A. 320,
324 (1937): "If they [directors] make a personal profit through the use of corporate assets,
they must account for it to the corporation. It is immaterial that their dealings may not
have caused a loss or been harmful to the corporation; the test of liability is whether they
have unjustly gained enrichment" (Emphasis added). See generally Marcus v. Otis, 168
F.2d 649, 654 (2d Cir. 1948), modified 169 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1948) (The use by a director
of corporate funds to buy stock in another corporation was both a conversion and violation
of a fiduciary duty allowing corporate recovery of the director's profits; 3 Fletcher, Private
Corporations § 898 (1947) ; Ballantine, Corporations 206 (Rev. ed. 1946).
31. 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949) (The board of directors secretly adopted a policy
to start buying outstanding shares in the market. The defendant, a confidential secretary to
a director, anticipating that such policy would bid up the market price of the shares pur-
chased some of the corporation's outstanding shares for himself).
32. Id. at 243, 70 A.2d 5 at 8.
33. Hauben v. Morris, 255 App. Div. 35, 5 N.Y.S.2d 721, (1st Dep't 1938) aff'd, 281
N.Y. 652, 22 N.E.2d 482.
34. Instant case at 288, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 303. (Emphasis added).
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"transactions in securities is not the legally significant factor."85 Implicit in the
decision of the court is the rationale adopted by a minority of the states.80
However, the Diamond court surprisingly does not find it necessary to support
its holding by citing as authority the other jurisdictions that have adopted the
"minority" rule. Instead, the court in the instant case rests its rather cursory
decision on the principles of agency and trust law, in particular, Section 388
Restatement of Agency 2d:
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent who makes a profit in connection
with transactions conducted by him or upon behalf of his principal,
is under a duty to give such profit to the principal.
and Comment (c) therein:
An agent who acquires confidential information in the course of his
employment... has a duty to account for any profits made by the use
of such information, although this does not harm the principal.8 7
The rule adopted by the Diamond court would allow, in a stock transaction
between a director and an outsider, a third party stockholder to bring an action
on behalf of the corporation for an accounting of profits, whether or not a loss
was sustained by the corporation. The decision represents a bold departure from
the present New York common law in the area of stock transactions by "in-
siders." The Appellate Division overrules what has apparently been accepted
law in the lower courts of New York for some time. For example, in Leffert v.
Marcus38 a stockholder's derivative action was brought against the defendant-
directors who had sold their stock in the corporation at an advantageous price
after using their corporate position to issue misleading statements concerning
the corporation's business affairs. The complaint in Leflert alleged a breach of
fiduciary duty in that the defendants used their corporate position for personal
profit rather than for the benefit of the corporation. The Leffert court dismissed
the complaint ruling that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action and noted
significantly "the absence of an allegation establishing any injury . . . to the
corporation."39 It may be argued, however, that Leffert is distinguishable from
Diamond since the defendants in Leffert are being charged with affirmative
misrepresentations rather than the use of corporate inside information. But, it
would seem that there is little significant difference between a director misusing
his position to misrepresent the truth and a director misusing his position by
35. Id.
36. See Cases cited and text accompanying suPra note 18.
37. Instant case at 288-89, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 304. (Emphasis added).
38. 12 Misc. 2d 1097, 174 N.Y.S.2d 546 (Sup. Ct. 1958), reversed on other grounds,
7 A.D.2d 989, 183 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1st Dep't 1958). Accord, Newman v. Baldwin, 13 Misc.
898, 179 N.Y.S.2d 19 (Sup. Ct. 1958) Defendant directors spread false reports concerning
corporation in order to create a rise in the market price of stock and then sold at a profit.
The court found "[the corporation lost nothing by the acts of the defendants . . . and is
entitled to no recovery therefor at common law" Id. at 902, 179 N.Y.S.2d at 23.
39. Id. at 1099, 174 N.Y.S.2d at 548. The appellant, in the instant case alleges a similar
point of law in his brief, pp. 8-9.
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failing to disclose the truth in connection with a sale of his personal holdings.
In both instances, the director misuses his corporate office; in both instances
he had to use inside information and then either misrepresent or fail to disclose
the truth. Presumably then, given the facts of the Leffert case, the Diamond
court would have reached an opposite result. There is one other New York case
in this area that should be noted. In Perlman v. Feldman4° a stockholder's
derivative action, based upon a violation of the common law, was upheld by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The Perlman court sustained the plaintiff's
claims on the theory that when Feldman and the other directors sold their con-
trolling stock, they received an unusual profit since control of the corporation
carried with it a valuable asset of the corporation, namely, the right to control
the corporation's production of steel, then in great demand. Perlman held that
the directors could not appropriate the value of this corporate asset to them-
selves. Based on this holding, support may be found for the instant decision on
the theory that both cases involved the use of a corporate asset and the lack of
an alleged harm to the corporation.
In permitting a shareholder to bring a derivative action against the cor-
porate directors, the Diamond court imposes a common law liability closely
parelleling that imposed by § 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.41
The section requires an insider to forfeit to the corporation "short-swing"
42
profits made in corporate stock transactions, regardless of loss to the corporate
entity. The wisdom of the court's application of federal statutory principles to
the factual context of Diamond is brought forth from a discussion of the history
and purpose of the Act.
The congressional hearings that led to the statute's enactment are replete
with examples showing how insiders exploited for their personal gain "inside
information" which came to them as fiduciaries. The Senate Report stated:
Among the most vicious practices unearthed at the hearings before
the subcommittee was the flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties by
directors and officers of corporations who used the confidential infor-
mation which came to them in such positions, to aid them in their mar-
ket activities ... and enable them to profit by information not avail-
able to others.43
In particular, § 16 (b) was designed to "fill the gap" in fiduciary law which
allowed the insider to make personal profits from using corporate inside infor-
mation.44 Indeed, the very practice which § 16 (b) was designated to deter is
40. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
41. 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1934). One significant purpose of the Act was to
eliminate the idea that the use of inside information for personal advantage was a normal
emolument of corporate office. See H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1934);
S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934); 10 SEC Ann. Rep. 50 (1944).
42. Section 16 (b) does not apply to all buying or selling of corporate securities by
insiders. It is applicable only when both purchase and sale occur within a six month period.
43. Sen. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 55 (1934).
44. Sen. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Seas., 9 (1934).
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presented by the facts in Diamond. In the present case, the defendants, solely
by virtue of their position as directors, learned that corporate earnings would
sharply decline. Before this information was known by the other shareholders
or the public the defendants sold their stock in the corporation. Thus, a sub-
stantial profit was realized by the defendants on the basis of their insiders'
knowledge. One New York case has held that § 16 (b) is not penal, but is
remedial in that its purpose is to deter "what was reasonably thought to be a
widespread abuse of a fiduciary relationship. ' 45 Moreover, the continuing ten-
dency of the decisions unders federal statutory law have been toward ever
wider application of its proscriptions.a6
Within this context of the Act's purpose the present decision is strikingly
significant when looked at as extending federal statutory law by reaching viola-
tions not covered by § 16 (b). This is demonstrated by the instant case where
the defendant's purchase and sale not being within § 16 (b)'s mechanistic six
month limitation 4 7 the plaintiff was precluded from bringing an action under
the section. 48 And though the six month limitation would not be a bar to an
action under § 10 (b) of the Act, relief in accordance with the section's provi-
sions could only be granted to the purchaser of the defendant's stock.49 There-
fore, the only remedy available to the plaintiff in the present case was under
common law fiduciary principles. However New York courts, antecedent to the
Diamond court's decision, had limited recovery in such instances to the de-
frauded purchaser of the director's stock. Also, a derivative action for an ac-
counting of the director's profits could not be maintained unless the corporation
has sustained some actual harm or loss.5°
It is submitted that by so limiting the imposition of liability upon directors,
the New York courts have provided mere illusory remedies for dealing with
fiduciary violations. Generally, when confidential information is used by a direc-
tor as a basis for his sale or purchase of the corporate stock, the corporation
will not suffer any loss. Moreover, why should injury to the corporation be
sine qua non to the maintenance of a derivative action when a director violates
45. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1959).
46. See, e.g., S. E. C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. g 92, 291(1968).
47. See supra note 42.
48. Another limitation of § 16 (b), though not applicable in the instant case, is that
it covers only listed securities. For a summary of proposals to expand the classes of securities
covered by § 16 (b), see Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Report on Unlisted
Securities, Sen. Rep. No. 700, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
49. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails or of any facility
or any national securities exchange-(a) ...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manip-
ulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964).
50. See cases cited and text accompanying supra notes 26-30.
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his fiduciary duty by using a corporate asset for personal gain? The courts
have, and correctly so, prevented further attempts by directors from utilizing
corporate inside information by divesting the offenders of their profits. How-
ever, the courts mistakenly have placed the legal redress of recovering profits
in the hands of the defrauded purchaser. This procedural remedy would appar-
ently be ineffective given the nature of todays security industry. The parties
to a stock transaction are generally anonymous as a result of the highly mech-
anized stock exchanges and the purchaser may never realize that the stock
transaction was made on the basis of inside information. Accordingly, the di-
rector's unjust enrichment never becomes his "just" demise. It would seem the
only effective and practical means to curtail fraudulent insider trading would
be to allow the stockholders, who are generally aware of a director's activity,
to bring an action and thereby have the director's profits inure to the corpora-
tion.r' Since the two principal aims in protecting the public investor are to pre-
vent possible abuses by corporate insiders from arising, in addition to, making
it facile as possible for offenders to be stripped of their profits, 52 the court's
decision would apparently, for the immediate future, insure this desirable policy.53
NICHOLAS J. SARGENT
NEGLIGENCE-CoMPLAINT ALLEGING MoHER's MENTAL DISTRESS
WITH PHYSICAL MANIFESTATIONS CAUSED BY WITNESSING DEATH OF HER
DAUGHTER OCCASIONED BY THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANT HELD
TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION EVEN THOUGH MOTHER NOT IN ZONE OF PERIL
While crossing a street, the plaintiff's infant daughter was struck and in-
jured by the defendant, who was allegedly operating his automobile in a negli-
gent manner. Such injuries proximately caused the decedent's death. The
plaintiff, the mother of the decedent, who was sitting on the porch of her home,
and the sister of the decedent who was standing on the curb near the point of
51. It could be argued that since the profits would be turned over to the corporate
treasury the directors who were guilty of making the profits and then deprived of them
nevertheless share in the recovery. However, the pro rata share of the benefit apportionable
to the defendant's interest would rarely be sufficient to justify a desire to have the total
profit annuled. In the instant case defendants owned, after the sale, 14% of the stock
outstanding.
52. See Comment, The Prospects for Rule X-1OB-5: An Emerging Remedy for De-
frauded Investors, 59 Yale L. J. 1120, 1156 (1950).
53. This policy, which the Diamond court adopts, is not beyond criticism since the
defendants in the instant case would be exposed to double liability. Presumably, the pur-
chasers of the stock would be successful in a suit alleging the directors had failed to disclose
material information. However, such a dilemma could be resolved by giving precedence to
the claim of the purchaser; though there are some legal writers who advocate a double
recovery on the theory that a wrong was perpetrated against both the corporation and pur-
chaser. See Comment, The Prospects for Rule X-lOB-5: An Emerging Remedy for-Defrauded
Investors, 59 Yale L. 3. 1120,. 1140-42 (1950). Compare Stevens, Corporations 701-02 (2d
ed. 1949).
